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Es ist dabei selbst die historische Wahrheit eine Nebensache, ein erfundenes Beispiel ko¨nnte
auch dienen; nur haben historische immer den Vorzug, praktischer zu sein und den Gedanken,
welchen sie erla¨utern, dem praktischen Leben selbst na¨her zu fu¨hren.
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
We discuss the strategy-proofness of multistage tournaments. In a tournament
with subsequent group stages, players are divided into groups in the preliminary
and main rounds, where they play pairwise matches against each other. The higher
ranked players qualify to the next stage such that matches are not repeated in the
main round if two qualified players have already faced in the preliminary round.
Players prefer to carry over better results to the main round, provided that they
qualify. It is shown that these tournament systems, widely used in handball, are
incentive incompatible. We also present some historical examples where a team was
ex ante not interested in winning by a high margin.
JEL classification number: C44, D71, L83
AMS classification number: 91B14





Strategy-proofness is an extensively discussed concept in social choice theory since the
famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) and the more general
Duggan-Schwartz (Duggan and Schwartz, 2000) impossibility theorems, which state that a
fair voting rule is susceptible to tactical voting: there always exists a voter who can achieve
a better outcome by being insincere. Nonetheless, there are several cases when an incentive
compatible rule can be found, but a method used in practice is manipulable. For example,
Tasna´di (2008) demonstrated that the Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, applied
between 1990 and 2010, suffers from the ’population paradox’ as the governing coalition
may lose seats either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes.
Similarly, the invariant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976), characterised by Palacios-Huerta
and Volij (2004), and used to quality-rank academic journals is subject to manipulation,
too, because a journal can boost its performance by making additional citations to other
journals (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2009).
Analysis of sport ranking rules from this perspective has started recently. Kendall and
Lenten (2017) is probably the first comprehensive review of sport regulations resulting
in unexpected consequences. On the basis of these examples, we have identified three
possible situations in which a team might prefer losing a game to winning it: (1) when a
team might gain advantages in the next season; (2) when a lower ranked team still qualify
and it might face a preferred competitor in the knockout stage; (3) when the team is
strictly better off by losing due to ill-constructed rules.
The classical example for the first situation arises from the reverse order applied in the
traditional set-up of player drafts, which supposedly increases competitive balance over time,
but if a team is still certainly eliminated from the play-off, it creates a perverse incentive
to tank the later games (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 4.1). The second situation
occurred in Badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics – Women’s doubles (Kendall and
Lenten, 2017, Section 3.3.1), and has probably inspired some game theoretical works on
the strategic manipulation problem (Pauly, 2014; Vong, 2017).
However, in the first case, the perverse incentives are not generated by tournament
rules, and in the second case, the team gains only in expected terms. We will address
here the remaining third situation, when tournament rules go awry such that a team is
guaranteed to benefit from exerting a lower effort.
It is far from trivial to identify an ill-constructed rule in the real world since usually
there is a low probability that it fails. Furthermore, a scandal has such an enormous cost
that the rule is almost certain to be never used again. Perhaps the most famous case
is a football match, Barbados vs. Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification), when a
sudden-death goal scored in extra time counted as double, creating an incentive to concede
a goal at the end of the match in order to gain additional time for a two-goal win (Kendall
and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.4). The Barbadians exploited this perverse rule by scoring
an own goal in the 87th minute (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017, Note 1). The match had not
affected any third team, so one can accept the decision of FIFA not to penalize Barbados
as the players were striving for the best outcome conditional upon the prevailing rules.
Nevertheless, this rule was not applied since then.
A similar situation was prevented by a FIBA1 rule saying that ’if a player deliberately
1 FIBA stands for Fe´de´ration internationale de basket-ball, French for International Basketball
Federation. It is an association of national organizations, governing international competitions in
basketball.
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scores in the team’s own basket, it is a violation and the basket does not count’: in the
men’s tournament of the 2014 Asian Games Basketball Competition, a Philippine player
shot at his own basket against Kazakhstan in order to force overtime and thus increase
the margin of victory (Carpio, 2014).
In the absence of comparable clear-cut events, authors often outline hypothetical
situations in order to motivate the importance of strategy-proofness. Dr. Andrei Brichkin
described a possible scenario in the Russian Premier League in 2012 under which one
team, Lokomotiv Moskva,2 should lose the final game of the national championship as
it would finish sixth independently of its last match, but losing would qualify the team
for the Europa League (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017, Section titled ’A Real-World Example’
and Note 5). Until the 2015-16 season, most UEFA3 national federations applied an
incentive incompatible allocation rule causing this problem. Dagaev and Sonin (2017) have
shown that similar tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knock-out
tournaments with noncumulative prizes, are strategy-proof only if all vacant slots are
awarded to the teams from the round-robin tournament. Now UEFA Champions League
and Europa League qualifications seems to be immune to manipulation.
Dagaev and Sonin (2013) have revealed and Dagaev and Sonin (2017) have mentioned
in a sentence that the European qualification for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil also
suffers from incentive incompatibility. Independently from these works, Csato´ (2017a) has
presented that 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) violates strategy-proofness.
Furthermore, Csato´ (2017b) has built a theoretical model containing this tournament,
identified nine recent incentive incompatible qualifications, and suggested a correction
mechanism. Csato´ (2017c) has presented that a scandal almost happened in 1995 due to
the bad tournament design.
This paper will show that tournaments with subsequent group stages, where some
matches from the preliminary round are carried over to the main round, suffer from
incentive incompatibility. In this respect, it is one of the follow-up papers promised in
Csato´ (2017b, Conclusions). Section 2 presents an example from handball, which may be
more serious than the match Barbados vs. Grenada as a probably unfair behaviour of a
team led to the elimination of a third team. Section 3 contains the theoretical model and
proves that the aforementioned competition format violates strategy-proofness. Section 4
lists some recent tournaments designed in this way and discusses the implications of our
formal results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings.
2 A real-world example
The 11th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF4 Euro 2014) was held in Denmark
between 12 and 26 January, 2014.5 16 national teams participated in the tournament. In
the preliminary round, they were divided into four groups (A-D), playing in a round-robin
format. The top three teams in each group qualified to the main round. Teams from
2The English website of UEFA mentions the team, based in Moscow, under this name.
3 UEFA stands for Union of European Football Associations, the administrative body for association
football in Europe. However, several UEFA member states are primarily or entirely located in Asia. It is
one of the six continental confederations of world football’s governing body FIFA.
4 EHF stands for European Handball Federation, the umbrella organization for European handball,
which was founded in 1991.
5 This section is mainly based on the Wikipedia page of 11th Men’s European Handball Championship
(EHF Euro 2014). We will cite only those official documents which concern the ranking of teams.
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Table 1: 11th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) – Group C
(a) Match results
Date First team Second team Result
13 January 2014, 18:00 Serbia Poland 20-19
13 January 2014, 20:15 France Russia 35-28
15 January 2014, 18:00 Russia Serbia 27-25
15 January 2014, 20:15 Poland France 27-28
17 January 2014, 18:00 Poland Russia to be played
17 January 2014, 20:15 Serbia France to be played
(b) Standing after two matchdays
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 2 matches.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 2 0 0 63 55 8 4
2 Serbia 1 0 1 45 46 -1 2
3 Russia 1 0 1 55 60 -5 2
4 Poland 0 0 2 46 48 -2 0
Groups A and B of the preliminary round composed the first main round group, while
teams from Groups C and D of the preliminary round composed the second main round
group. Main round groups were organized in a round-robin format, too, but all matches
(consequently, results and points), played in the preliminary round between teams that
were in the same main round group, were kept and remained valid for the ranking of the
main round.
In the groups of the preliminary and main rounds, two points were awarded for a
win, one point for a draw and zero points for a defeat. Teams were ranked by adding
up their number of points. If two or more teams had an equal number of points, the
following tie-breaking criteria were used after the completion of preliminary round matches,
according to EHF (2014a, Article 9.12):
a) Higher number of points obtained in the group matches played amongst the teams
in question;
b) Superior goal difference from the group matches played amongst the teams in
question;
c) Higher number of goals scored in the group matches played amongst the teams in
question;
d) Superior goal difference from all group matches (achieved by subtraction);
e) Higher number of goals scored in all group matches.
During the preliminary round, a strange situation emerged in Group C, which is worth
further investigation. On 16 January, 2014, each team in the group had one more game to
play. Table 1 shows the known results and the preliminary standing of the group.
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Consider the situation from the perspective of Poland. The team is eliminated if it
does not win against Russia. Poland carries over 0 points, 46 goals for and 48 goals against
to the main round if it wins against Russia and Serbia plays at least a draw against France.
If Poland wins by 𝑥 goals against Russia and Serbia loses, there will be three teams with 2
points, which obtained 2 points in the group matches played among them. Consequently,
the second tie-breaking criteria should be applied: Poland, Russia and Serbia will have
head-to-head goal differences of 𝑥− 1, 2− 𝑥 and −1, respectively. Serbia is eliminated as
the fourth team if 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 2. Russia and Serbia has the same head-to-head goal difference
if 𝑥 = 3, hence higher number of goals scored against the three teams with 2 points break
the tie. It is 45 for Serbia and at least 27 for Russia, thus Russia qualifies if it scores
at least 19 goals against Poland (if Poland vs. Russia is 21-18, then the third place will
depend on the result of Serbia vs. France). If 𝑥 ≥ 4, then Serbia has a better head-to-head
goal difference than Russia, so Serbia qualifies and Russia is eliminated.
Note that if Poland wins, it carries over its result against Russia (2 points) or Serbia
(0 points) to the main round, thus Poland has a strong incentive to qualify together with
Russia. Hence it is unfavourable for Poland to win by more than three goals against Russia
as this scenario yields no gain in the main round, but may lead to a loss of 2 points if
Serbia is defeated by France. Russia is clearly better off by a smaller defeat.
In fact, Poland vs. Russia was 24-22 and Serbia vs. France was 28-31, so France, Poland
and Russia qualified to the main round with 4, 2 and 0 points, respectively. Naturally, it
is not a proof that Poland manipulated, but the circumstances are at least suspicious: the
result of Poland vs. Russia was 10-14 after 30 minutes (half-time), while the match stood
at 21-16 in the 48th, 22-17 in the 50th, and 23-18 in the 52th minute (EHF, 2014b).
The probably unfair behaviour of Poland resulted in the elimination of a third, innocent
team, Serbia, which makes the situation more worrying than any other case from the
history of sport we know about. It seems to be a very persuading argument against the
rules of 11th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014).
3 The model
In this section, we will build a model for a tournament consisting of round-robin preliminary
and main rounds, where matches played in the preliminary round against teams qualified
to the same main round group are carried over. It will be revealed that these systems are
incentive incompatible, that is, they are vulnerable to a manipulation identical to the one
presented in Section 2. Our notations follow Csato´ (2017b) in certain details since the
qualification system discussed there is also based on groups organized in a round-robin
format.
Definition 3.1. Round-robin tournament: Let 𝑋 be a nonempty finite set of at least
two teams, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 be two teams and 𝑣 : 𝑋 × 𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N} ∪ {—} be a
function such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if and only if 𝑥 = 𝑦. The pair (𝑋, 𝑣) is called a round-robin
tournament.
Function 𝑣 describes game results with the number of goals scored by the first and
second team, respectively.
Definition 3.2. Single round-robin tournament: Round-robin tournament (𝑋, 𝑣) is single
if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) and 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋.
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In a single round-robin tournament, any two teams play each other only once (often at
a neutral site), so the order of the teams has no significance.
Definition 3.3. Double round-robin tournament: Round-robin tournament (𝑋, 𝑣) is
double if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) and 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) is allowed for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋.
In a home-and-away round-robin tournament, any two teams play each other once at
home and once at away. The first team is the one playing at home.
Definition 3.4. Incomplete round-robin tournament: Let 𝑋 be a nonempty finite set of
at least two teams, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 be two teams and 𝑣 : 𝑋 ×𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N} ∪ {—}
be a function such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if 𝑥 = 𝑦. The pair (𝑋, 𝑣) is called an incomplete
round-robin tournament.
In an incomplete round-robin tournament, some matches between the teams remains to
be played. Note that any round-robin tournament is an incomplete round-robin tournament,
too.
Definition 3.5. Ranking in incomplete round-robin tournaments: Let 𝒳 be the set of
incomplete round-robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋. A ranking method 𝑅 maps
any characteristic function 𝑣 of 𝒳 into a strict order 𝑅(𝑣) on the set 𝑋.
Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be an incomplete round-robin tournament, 𝑅(𝑣) be its ranking and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋,
𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 be two different teams. 𝑥 is said to be ranked higher (lower) than 𝑦 if and only if
𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦 (𝑥 ≺𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦).
Let 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 be two different teams and 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦); 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)). It is said
that team 𝑥 wins over team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away),
team 𝑥 loses to team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away) and
teams 𝑥 draws with team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦).
Since in some team sports (basketball, ice hockey, volleyball, etc.) draws are not
allowed, and we want to keep the model as general as possible, this possibility is excluded
in the following.
Assumption 3.1. No matches result in a draw: 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) ̸= 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) for any incomplete
round-robin tournament (𝑋, 𝑣) and teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋.
Ranking is usually based on points.
Definition 3.6. Number of points: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be an incomplete round-robin tournament
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) the number of wins and by 𝑁 𝑙𝑣(𝑥) the number
of losses of team 𝑥 in (𝑋, 𝑣), respectively. The number of points of team 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) =
𝛼𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) + 𝛽𝑁 𝑙𝑣(𝑥) such that 𝛼 > 𝛽.
In other words, a win means 𝛼 points and a loss means 𝛽 points.
Number of points is not guaranteed to induce a strict order on the set of teams, hence
some tie-breaking rules are needed.
Definition 3.7. Goal difference: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be an incomplete round-robin tournament




(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋,𝑦 ̸=𝑥
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
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Goal difference is the difference of the number of goals scored for team 𝑥 and the
number of goals conceded by team 𝑥.
Definition 3.8. Head-to-head results: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a round-robin tournament and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋
be a team. Denote by 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑋 ∖ {𝑥} a set of teams.
The head-to-head number of points of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝛼 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |) +
+𝛽 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |)




(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
In accordance with EHF (2014a, Articles 9.12 and 9.24), head-to-head results can be
calculated only if all group matches were played.
Definition 3.9. Monotonicity of group ranking: Let 𝒳 be the set of incomplete round-
robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋, and 𝑅 be a ranking method. 𝑆 is monotonic if
for any characteristic function 𝑣 and for any different teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦:
1. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑣(𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑦), furthermore, if (𝑋, 𝑣) is a round-robin
tournament, then 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦), or 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑦) where
𝑧 ∈ 𝐿 if and only if 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑧) ⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣) 𝑦.
Monotonicity implies that (a) a team should be ranked higher if it has a greater number
of points (criterion 1); (b) a team should be ranked higher compared to another with
the same number of points, an inferior goal difference and worse head-to-head results
against all teams with the same number of points (criterion 2). Monotonicity still does not
imply that the ranking is unique. The complexity of Definition 3.8 is necessary in order to
cover the two different tie-breaking rules, goal difference and head-to-head concepts. For
example, in association football FIFA usually uses the former, while UEFA applies the
latter.
Definition 3.10. Preliminary round: A preliminary round 𝒢 consists of 𝑘 groups of
round-robin tournaments (𝑋1, 𝑣1), (𝑋2, 𝑣2), . . . , (𝑋𝑘, 𝑣𝑘) such that 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋ℎ = ∅ for any
𝑖 ̸= ℎ.
Definition 3.11. Main round: A main round ℳ consists of ℓ groups of incomplete
round-robin tournaments (𝑌 1, 𝑤1), (𝑌 2, 𝑤2), . . . , (𝑌 ℓ, 𝑤ℓ) such that 𝑌 𝑗 ∩ 𝑌 ℎ = ∅ for any
𝑗 ̸= ℎ.
Definition 3.12. Qualification rule: Let 𝒢 be a preliminary round and ℳ be a main
round. A qualification rule is a mapping 𝒬 : 𝒳 1 ×𝒳 2 × · · · × 𝒳 𝑘 → 𝒴1 × 𝒴2 × · · · × 𝒴ℓ.
Team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 is said to be qualified to the main round if 𝑥 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗.
Definition 3.13. Tournament with subsequent group stages: A tournament with subsequent
group stages is the triple (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) consisting of a preliminary round 𝒢, a main round ℳ
and a qualification rule 𝒬.
7
Definition 3.14. Regularity of a qualification rule: Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a tournament with
subsequent group stages. Qualification rule 𝒬 is regular if:
a) ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 ⊆ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖;
b) there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑅 in each group of the preliminary
round 𝒢 such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦, 𝑦 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 imply
𝑥 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗;
c) 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩ 𝑌 𝑗 implies 𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦);
d) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋ℎ, ℎ ̸= 𝑖 and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 imply 𝑤(𝑥, 𝑦) = —;
e) there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑆 in each group of the main round ℳ.
The idea behind a regular qualification rule is straightforward. Some top teams of the
preliminary round groups qualify to the main round (conditions a) and b)), where they
are organized into new groups such that matches already played against other qualified
teams are carried over to the main round (conditions c) and d)). Furthermore, rankings in
the preliminary and main round groups should be monotonic (conditions b) and e)).
Perhaps these ideas have inspired the decision-makers of EHF.
Definition 3.15. Manipulation: Consider a tournament with subsequent group sta-
ges (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) and a set of preliminary round results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
. A
team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) if there exists a set of group results 𝑉 ={︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖,
furthermore, 𝑥 ∈ ∪ℓ𝑗=1𝑌 𝑗 according to both 𝒬(𝑉 ) and 𝒬(𝑉 ) such that 𝑠𝑤(𝑥) < 𝑠?¯?(𝑥), or
𝑠𝑤(𝑥) = 𝑠?¯?(𝑥) and 𝑔𝑑𝑤(𝑥) < 𝑔𝑑?¯?(𝑥).
Manipulation means that team 𝑥 can increase its number of points, or improve its goal
difference with the same number of points in the main round by conceding more goals in a
match of the preliminary round.
Definition 3.16. Strategy-proofness: A tournament with subsequent group stages
(𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) is called strategy-proof if there exists no set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
under which a team can manipulate it.
Our main results concern the strategy-proofness of tournaments with subsequent group
stages such that the qualification rule is regular. Note that manipulation certainly worsen
a team’s goal difference (and sometimes its number of points, too) in the given group as
the ranking rule applied here is monotonic, but – provided that the team still qualifies
– it may pay off in the main round, where some matches of the preliminary round are
discarded.
Theorem 3.1. Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a tournament with subsequent group stages such that 𝒬
is a regular qualification rule and the following conditions hold:
∙ there exists 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∪ 𝑌 𝑗 for some 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ;
∙ for at least one 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘, there exists 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 with 𝑢 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 implying 𝑣 /∈ 𝑌 𝑗 for
all 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ.
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Then the tournament with subsequent group stages (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) does not satisfy strategy-
proofness.
Theorem 3.1 requires that the result of at least one match played in the preliminary
round is carried over to main round, and the result of at least one such match is ignored.
Proof. An example is presented where a team can manipulate a tournament with subsequent
group stages that satisfies all criteria of Theorem 3.1.
Table 2: Group 1 of Example 3.1
GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal difference; Pts = Points.
Last but one row contains the group winner’s benchmark results that are carried over to the main round.
Last row contains the group winner’s alternative results that are carried over to the main round, obtained
if it manipulates.
Position Team 𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 GF GA GD Pts
1 𝑎 — 0-1 4-0 4 1 3 𝛼 + 𝛽
2 𝑏 1-0 — 0-2 1 2 -1 𝛼 + 𝛽
3 𝑐 0-4 2-0 — 2 4 -2 𝛼 + 𝛽
1 𝑎 — 0-1 — 0 1 -1 𝛽
1* 𝑎* — — 2-0* 2* 0* 2* 𝛼*
Example 3.1. Let 𝑋1 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} such that the group is a single round-robin tournament.
Consider the regular qualification rule 𝒬 with ℓ = 1 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑌 1 if and only if{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑅(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧
}︁
̸= ∅. 𝒬 says that the group winner and the runner-up qualify to the
main round.
A possible set of results in Group 1 is shown in Table 2. Team 𝑎 is the group-winner
since it has the best (head-to-head) goal difference (see criterion 2 of a monotonic group
ranking method), and it is considered with 𝑠𝑤(𝑎) = 𝛽 points in the main round, after
discarding its match against team 𝑐, the last in Group 1 due to criterion 2 of a monotonic
group ranking method (see the last but one row of Table 2).
However, examine what happens if 𝑣1(𝑎, 𝑐) = (2; 0) (thus 𝑣1(𝑐, 𝑎) = (0; 2)). Then
teams 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 remain with 𝛼+ 𝛽 points, but they have head-to-head goal differences
of +1, −1 and 0, respectively, thus 𝑎 is the first and 𝑐 is the second according to
criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking method. Consequently, team 𝑎 is considered
with 𝑠?¯?(𝑎) = 𝛼 > 𝛽 = 𝑠𝑤(𝑎) points in the main round (see the last row of Table 3).
To summarize, team 𝑎 has an opportunity to manipulate this simple tournament with
subsequent group stages under the set of group results 𝑉 , so it is not strategy-proof.
Example 3.1 contains only three teams, which is minimal with respect to the conditions
of Theorem 3.1. It is clear that the number of groups and the number of teams in them can
be increased without changing the essence of the counterexample. Furthermore, groups
can be double round-robin tournaments instead of single ones.
Theorem 3.1 remains valid if draws are allowed in the tournament with subsequent
group stages, too.
Remark 3.1. The 11th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014), dis-
cussed in Section 2, fits into the model presented above. The number of groups in the
preliminary round is 𝑘 = 4, the number of groups in the main round is ℓ = 2, and the
qualification rule is regular (EHF, 2014a):
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a) 𝑌 1 ⊂ 𝑋1 ∪𝑋2 and 𝑌 2 ⊂ 𝑋3 ∪𝑋4;
b) Ranking in the preliminary round groups is monotonic as it is based on the
number of points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results, and the first
three teams qualify to the main round;
c) Matches played during the preliminary round against opponents which qualified
to the main round are kept and remain valid for the ranking of the main round;
d) Matches of the main round are played in groups with each team facing three
opponents which did not participated in its preliminary round group;
e) Ranking in the main round groups is monotonic as it is based on the number of
points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results.
Proposition 3.1. The 11th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014)
is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The scenario presented in Section 2 shows that team Poland = 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋3 can manipu-
late since there exist sets of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4} and 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, 𝑣3, 𝑣4} such
that 𝑣3 = 𝑣3, 𝑣31(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣31(𝑥, 𝑦) = 26 with the exception of 𝑣32(𝑥, 𝑦) = 24 > 22 = 𝑣32(𝑥, 𝑦),
where team Russia = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋3 and Poland qualifies according to 𝒬(𝑉 ) and 𝒬(𝑉 ), but
𝑠𝑤(𝑥) = 0 < 2 = 𝑠?¯?(𝑥).
Theorem 3.1 can also be applied due to Remark 3.1.
Now we state a positive result, a ’pair’ of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. Let (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) be a tournament with subsequent group stages such that 𝒬
is a regular qualification rule and at least one of the following conditions hold:
∙ there does not exist 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∪ 𝑌 𝑗 for any 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ ℓ;
∙ 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 implies 𝑣 ∈ 𝑌 𝑗 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘.
Then the tournament with subsequent group stages (𝒢,ℳ,𝒬) is strategy-proof.
Proof. If all preliminary round results obtained against other qualified are carried over to
the main round or ignored, then it makes no sense to exert a lower effort in the preliminary
round.
Theorem 3.2 practically says that teams qualifying from the same preliminary round
group should be drawn into different main round groups (it is guaranteed if only one team
qualifies from each preliminary round group), or all teams from a given preliminary round
group should qualify to the same main round group, or some matches should be repeated
in the tournament.
Consequently, our main result seems to be related to the finding of Vong (2017) that in
general multistage tournaments, the necessary and sufficient condition of strategy-proofness
is to allow only the top-ranked player to qualify from each group. However, in the model
of Vong (2017), teams deliberately lose matches in order to meet preferred opponents in
the next round, so they only gain in expected value. Contrarily, we have discussed the
possibility that a team is strictly better off by exerting a lower effort.
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4 Discussion
The Men’s European Handball Championship is the official competition for senior men’s
national handball teams of Europe. It takes place every two years since 1994 and serves
as a qualification for the Olympic Games and World Championship, too.
The tournaments between 1994 and 2000 consisted of a group stage followed by a
knock-out stage, hence they were incentive compatible. Since 2002, its format is the same
as outlined in Section 2: there is a preliminary round with four groups of four teams each
such that the first three teams qualify to the main round with two groups of six teams each
(three-three from two groups of the preliminary round), and they carry over the matches
against the two teams in their preliminary round group. The winners and runners-up of
the main round groups qualify to the semifinals.
During the 10th Men’s European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2012), a situation
analogous to the one presented in Section 2 emerged: Slovenia plays its last match in
Group D against Iceland such that Croatia had 4 points after it won against Iceland and
Slovenia, Norway had 2 points because of its win against Slovenia by 28-27, and Iceland
had also 2 points due to its win against Norway by 34-32. Consequently, Slovenia should
win against against Iceland for qualification to the main round, but it would be better not
to win by more than 3 goals in order to carry over the result against Iceland. The actual
results were Iceland vs. Slovenia 32-34, and Croatia vs. Norway 26-22, so the manipulation
of Slovenia turned out to be successful (with Iceland vs. Slovenia 31-34 or 32-35, Iceland
still would have qualified, but 30-34, 31-35, or 32-36 would be unfavourable for Slovenia).
The Women’s European Handball Championship is the official competition for senior
women’s national handball teams of Europe. The tournament also serves as a qualification
for the Olympic Games and World Championship. It takes place in the same years as
Men’s European Handball Championships, and is organized in the same format, so it was
also strategy-proof until 2000, but incentive incompatible from 2002.
The Women’s EHF Champions League is an official competition for women’s handball
clubs of Europe, organized annually since the season of 1993-94. It is the most competitive
and prestigious tournament for the top clubs of the continent’s leading national leagues. It
is organized with subsequent group stages since 2013-14. The preliminary round consists
of four groups of four teams each, playing each other twice in home and away matches
such that the best three teams qualify. In the main round, two groups of six teams are
formed, and teams play those three teams they have not already faced twice, in home and
away matches. The top four teams from each group advance to the quarter-finals.
Table 3 summarizes our findings on incentive incompatible tournaments; Men’s (Wo-
men’s) EHF Euro stands for Men’s (Women’s) European Handball Championship, and
Women’s EHF CL shortens Women’s EHF Champions League. They all contain two
subsequent group stages, and the number of qualified teams in the main round (see the last
column) is the number of teams which can win the tournament, not taking into account
the possible matches for fifth and seventh places.
It is clear from our theoretical results, presented in Section 3, that – contrary to
tournament systems consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments (Dagaev
and Sonin, 2017), or group-based qualification systems (Csato´, 2017b) – there is no straig-
htforward way to guarantee the incentive compatibility of tournaments with subsequent
group stages. According to Theorem 3.2, strategy-proofness is met if either all matches
from the preliminary round are considered in the main round, or all of them are discarded,
11
Table 3: Tournaments with subsequent group stages
S = single round-robin (in groups); D = double round-robin (in groups); Gr. = Number of groups in the
preliminary and main round, respectively; Teams = Number of teams in each group of the preliminary
and main round, respectively; Q = Number of teams qualified from each group of the preliminary and
main round, respectively
Preliminary round Main round
Tournament Sport Type Gr. Teams Q Gr. Teams Q
2002 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2004 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2006 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2008 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2010 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2012 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2014 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2016 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2018 Men’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2002 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2004 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2006 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2008 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2010 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2012 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2014 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2016 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2018 Women’s EHF Euro Handball S 4 4 3 2 6 2
2013-14 Women’s EHF CL Handball D 4 4 3 2 6 4
2014-15 Women’s EHF CL Handball D 4 4 3 2 6 4
2015-16 Women’s EHF CL Handball D 4 4 3 2 6 4
2016-17 Women’s EHF CL Handball D 4 4 3 2 6 4
2017-18 Women’s EHF CL Handball D 4 4 3 2 6 4
which is against the essence of these tournaments.6
Perhaps the only solution is to carry over all preliminary round results to the main
round – not only the matches played against teams which qualify to the same main round
group –, regardless that some matches were played against teams already eliminated from
the tournament.
5 Conclusions
Design of sport ranking rules is an important topic of Operational Research. We have
presented that practitioners, especially tournament organizers, should not miss analysing
strategy-proofness since complex tournament formats may create perverse incentives for
6 It is worth to note that 2001-02 UEFA Champions League also included two group stages: from the
first group stage of eight groups with four teams each, eight winners and eight runners-up were drawn into
four groups of four teams each, containing two group winners and two runners-up such that teams from
the same country or from the same first round group could not be drawn together. The last condition
would have guaranteed strategy-proofness even if matches would have allowed to carry over.
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some competitors. While the actual probability of manipulation can be relatively small,
and the audience does not always recognize the problem, it is not worth to risk a potential
scandal which has enormous financial and reputational costs. The way of manipulation
discussed here may also violate our sense of fairness as a third team is hurt by it.
It is somewhat surprising that we have not found any controversy about the probable
manipulation presented in Section 2. We think it is because of the complex detection:
compared to the football and basketball matches discussed in Section 1, it was enough to
make some mistakes in defence or attack, scoring of own goals was unnecessary. One can
understood that EHF remained silent on this issue, while the audience obviously did not
studied the tie-breaking rules carefully. On the other hand, it is almost sure that coaches
and players knew that they should not make great efforts to win by a higher margin. We
hope the the paper contributes to placing this match in the category of the notorious
’Nichtangriffspakt (Schande) von Gijo´n’7 (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.1) in the
history of sports.
There are at least two directions for future scientific research. First, other tournaments
can be examined from the perspective of strategy-proofness and some suggestions can be
made for the modification of their design. Second, by the quantification of team strengths
and the modelling of match outcomes, the probability of manipulation can be estimated.
We think it is not negligible in the case of European Handball Championships as two
examples have been found from the 2× 8× 4 = 64 observations represented by groups in
the preliminary rounds of EHF Euros, which took place between 2002 and 2016.
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